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THE INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY OF ED BAKER
Vincent Blasi*
John Stuart Mill was not one of Ed Baker’s favorite authors, although
Ed knew his Mill well and drew on him for some of his important work. But I
know Ed Baker would have been a particular favorite of John Stuart Mill. I say
that not generically, but specifically. Mill said that what an adaptive, improving
society needs most of all—even more than technological expertise—is the
hardest thing to achieve: independent thinkers who have the courage to follow
their thought wherever it leads, even when that journey risks unsettling their
cherished beliefs or damaging their credibility.1 Ed Baker was that rare
specimen, a truly independent thinker.
Courage is hard to come by, not least in academia. It is not easy when a
scholar discovers that where his thought leads him will disappoint his
intellectual compatriots or cause his ideas to be profiled unfairly. It is not easy
when he learns that where he needs to go entails additional research or selftraining that will require much more time and effort than he had planned to
devote to a project. Genuine curiosity can lead a scholar out of his comfort
zone, into domains where he lacks intellectual capital and/or credentials. In that
circumstance, he may need months or years to get up to speed, all the while not
knowing whether the effort will yield anything of value. But if he is going to
explore a subject or problem or idea in the right way, sometimes that kind of
risky, arduous, patient undertaking is requisite. Most of us, when we confront
that hurdle, find ways to redefine our project. Ed Baker did not do that. He put
in the time and took the risk.
Another form of faint-hearted backing off relates to conclusions and
types of argumentation. No scholar really prefers to take positions that most
people think are impractical, too theoretical, or too idealistic. No scholar really
prefers to advance a thesis that depends on arguments that do not summarize
easily and that ask a lot of the reader. Most of us find ways to schematize. We
compromise in the service of respectability, accessibility, or eloquence. Most of
us, but not Ed Baker. I have known no more uncompromising scholar. He
followed his thought where it led, in all sorts of directions he could not have
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predicted and may not have welcomed. In that sense, he truly was the Millian
independent thinker with genuine, rare, scholarly courage.
Examples of the fearlessness that was such an important dimension of
Ed’s intellectual integrity are many and various. He wrote a review of one of
Catharine MacKinnon’s most widely read books, Only Words.2 The title is
sarcastic. The book advances the thesis that words (and images) always have
consequences in that they constitute power relations. The title of Ed’s review is
Of Course, More Than Words.3 He then goes on to show that Professor
MacKinnon’s foundational observation does not begin to make her case for the
constitutional legitimacy of regulating such consequential behavior. His review
begins with a comprehensive summary of the various ways in which
pornography does harm, then demonstrates how that harm still does not justify
the regulations that MacKinnon endorses. Particularly courageous about that
review is what Ed says about what might be called the democratic politics of
misogyny. He criticizes Professor MacKinnon for not trusting democratic
politics as much as she needs to. If we are to counter the harm that pornography
does, Baker maintains, it is going to have to come through improved public
understanding, not resented legal coercion. More people must come to
appreciate how much injury is caused by degrading, servile, inauthentic
portrayals of female sexuality.
Now, persons who share Ed’s general political disposition might be
troubled, I imagine, by the degree to which he makes room for a grassroots
politics expressing certain misogynistic attitudes and premises. Can that
possibly be what democratic politics is about? Ed courageously advances an
argument that indeed we have to allow people to develop their ideas, however
harmful and benighted. He had a true Brandeisian commitment to fighting bad
ideas with good ideas through the medium of grassroots democratic politics. He
believed that such distasteful and draining combat is the only effective way to
contain the harms that speech can do. Ed maintained that government cannot
ever regulate speech on the ground that people will be persuaded by it. That is a
familiar bromide of the First Amendment lexicon, but most sophisticated
analysts embrace it only to a degree. Ed was an absolutist on this point, an
intellectually courageous position to take. And unlike most “absolutists,” he did
not treat the position as self-evident, or compelled by constitutional text or
history. He developed and defended his absolutism regarding pornography with
sophistication and candor.
Probably the most controversial as well as consequential free speech
issue of our day is campaign finance regulation. Ed’s view, developed with
considerable ingenuity, was that elections are not a true measure of the
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democratic will.4 You can imagine how vulnerable this view made him look.
He believed that it is very important for a free society to develop a true
democratic will. That is what the First Amendment is all about. But the way a
society develops a true democratic will, and measures and nurtures and
energizes it, is through all sorts of institutional commitments and human
interactions other than elections. In this view, elections have a crucial role to
play, but it is an instrumental role, that of distributing power so as to implement
a democratic will that is developed not in the electoral process itself but rather
in a never-ending, ongoing, grassroots process, a less calculating and focused
procedure than an election. A society needs decisions pertaining to operational
governance. Ed was no defender of anarchy or of the law of the jungle. But he
believed that the integrity of the democratic will is the foundation of just
governance. The problem with elections as a site for determining the
democratic will, as he saw it, is that they are dominated by strategy.
My own behavior during the presidential election of 2008 makes his
point. As an observer of that election, my mind was working overtime to
calculate which are the real swing states and what sound bites would work with
which constituencies. Whatever else I was doing, I was not participating in the
ongoing formation of a genuine democratic will. On that occasion, I wanted my
candidate to win so badly that all other considerations took a back seat. When
he did, I indulged in a heartfelt victory lap, so to speak. But that kind of
competitive quest and triumph, Ed asserted and I must concede, has very little
to do with the forming of a democratic will. It entails a whole different set of
judgments, understandings, and priorities.
You can appreciate what a gutsy guy Ed was to challenge the
democratic bona fides of elections and then argue that speech in that context
can be regulated consistent with a commitment to respect the integrity of the
democratic will. Characteristically, Ed formulated this bold argument only after
making many appropriate concessions and paying scrupulous attention to the
counter-arguments that could be mounted against it. His position was
provocative, but his analysis was methodical and thorough.
It is a sign of his thoroughness, as well as his intellectual courage, that
he held his ground even to the point of advocating the regulation of
independent expenditures surrounding elections.5 One might think that even if
the strategic speech of an office-seeker and her campaign apparatus has little to
do with expressing or generating any kind of authentic democratic will, the
speech of independent citizens about political candidates should not be
considered to be so unremittingly strategic. Isn’t such speech better classified
as grassroots democracy speaking out on the most important concerns of the
day? Ed, undaunted, developed the argument that it depends on who is the
4
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purportedly “independent” speaker. An independent speaker, in his view, is not
just any person or entity that is trying to influence an election. To qualify as an
independent speaker possessed of robust First Amendment rights in the election
setting by virtue of helping to constitute the democratic will, an organization
must have an existence throughout the year that entails speaking to a variety of
issues and communicating with its intended audience on a regular basis. In
contrast, if a speaker is an entity that is cranked up just to win an election, it
should be seen as engaging in strategic speech, the type of communication that
has little to do with the formation of a genuine democratic will. Such speech,
Ed believed, can be regulated in the same way that society can regulate
campaigning too close to a voting booth or decide who is entitled to appear on
the ballot.
In his ambitious, deeply informed and informative book Media
Concentration and Democracy,6 Ed addressed the dangers that stem from
media concentration. Before reading the book, potential critics might suppose
that this topic is a little dated. After all, don’t we have an Internet? One can
imagine a scholar who is interested in the subject of media concentration
treating this objection grudgingly. Not Ed. The book takes that bull by the
horns. It is largely about why the advent of the Internet does not diminish the
problem of media concentration. One of the many reasons why I think Ed
would have been a favorite of John Stuart Mill is that he approached objections
to his arguments the way Mill insisted they must be treated: with respect, even
gratitude. Mill wanted the counter-arguments to his ideas stated fairly,
powerfully, with lucid articulation and imaginative development. He viewed
counter-arguments as opportunities to clarify and refine one’s understanding.7
That attitude is on display in Media Concentration and Democracy. Most of us,
when we grudgingly attend to counter-arguments, find it hard to resist the
temptation to present them in a slightly cartoonish form. We inflate the claims
of the critics (real or hypothesized) who make the counter-arguments, and we
present their evidence selectively and schematically. When Ed addressed
counter-arguments, he not only showed that he had done his homework, he
helped readers to navigate the bibliographic landscape so as to be able to form
their own judgments regarding which side of the dispute has the stronger case.
And he was scrupulously honest and thorough in presenting the claims and
evidence he was at pains to refute.
This pattern in his scholarship relates to what I was speaking of earlier
regarding the tendency of most of us to define the scope of our endeavors in a
way that permits us to avoid being drawn into time-consuming research
projects. Ed decided that if he was going to address the Internet counterargument, he was going to have to study in some detail how the Internet is used
6
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and how this relates to problems of media concentration. That led him to
plunge into a vast new literature. He canvassed numerous studies of who reads
blogs and whose blogs are read. He concluded that it is simplistic to imagine
that anybody can just set up a blog and begin to communicate to a mass
audience. He maintained that it still matters a great deal what ideas and facts
are transmitted by media giants. And he discovered that by some measures
there is surprisingly a greater phenomenon of concentration in the blogosphere
than in the newspaper industry. The ten most-read blogs attract a higher
percentage of the blogosphere audience than the ten most-read newspapers do
of the newspaper audience. If we broaden the inquiry to the eighty most-read
blogs and eighty most-read newspapers, the pattern of concentration holds:
“The data indicate . . . that even though there are apparently millions of selfpublishing bloggers, concentration of audience attention is extreme. . . . Of
these millions of bloggers, most could probably reach larger audiences if they
spent a couple of hours in the old-fashion activity distributing hand-bills in the
town center . . . .”8
Ed also developed an argument about the economic logic of why media
concentration replicates itself in the blogosphere. As reduced distribution costs
make it feasible technically to reach a larger audience, the potential efficiency
of successful audience acquisition techniques makes it economically logical to
put more effort into that endeavor. And that brings into play the dynamics of
concentration regarding branding and leveraging and tie-ins and the like. So it
is not surprising that we have this kind of concentration in the blogosphere.
One of the features of Ed Baker’s scholarship that impresses me is his
versatility. His study of media concentration is rich in empirical findings and
economic logic. But philosophical and conceptual matters were equally
important to him. The First Amendment states in part: “Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . . . .” One question
presented by this formulation is whether it refers to two discrete freedoms, with
distinctive histories and implications, or one cognate freedom to communicate.
Some scholars have argued that the freedom of the press is not distinct from the
freedom of speech. Ed, on the other hand, took on this question in a most
interesting way.9 He showed how the case law treats the press differently from
individual speakers. Not in libel where it would not make sense to do so, but in
disclosure requirements, for example, and also in imposing certain must-carry
obligations. In fact, there are many ways in which the case law that we have
treats the press differently from other kinds of speakers, and such differential
treatment has not been controversial. This feature of the case law has
implications, Ed argued, for the foundational question of whether we have a

8
9
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distinctive constitutional principle of freedom of the press that is separate from
the freedom of speech.
If so, it becomes imperative to define who counts as “the press,” not an
easy matter in the age of the Internet. Never one to shy away from the hard
questions, Ed produced a detailed analysis of the various ways in which one
can decide who is “the press.” Characteristically taking a bold position, certain
to attract criticism of a practical as well as a theoretical nature, he maintained
that the purpose of the speaker is what matters most in determining who is “the
press.”10 He addressed both practical problems of proof and why theoretically
the purpose of the speaker is the key to qualifying for the status of “press” as
the First Amendment employs that concept. I believe that Ed attributed more
significance to the phenomenon of speaker purpose than does any other leading
First Amendment thinker. That is where his thought led him—his disciplined,
rigorous, fearless thought. And even though many critics would never get past
the considerable practical problems of proving what purpose a speaker may
have had, Ed did not eschew reliance on that variable because he found it to be
so central to the constitutional commitment.
Ed Baker first came to my attention as an important scholar with two
articles he wrote in the mid-1970s addressing the question of what is the proper
scope of the First Amendment.11 Currently, that is a dominant, much-disputed
question, but in 1976 there was not much systematic writing about it. The
whole matter was somewhat taken for granted or bracketed in the literature. Ed
said: let’s wait, the most important question really is what is the domain that is
covered by this phrase “the freedom of speech or of the press.” Does it really
cover commercial advertising?12 Does it really cover symbolic speech? Why?
What are our criteria for determining the scope of coverage? His early work
was at the forefront of what became a seismic shift in debate about the meaning
of the freedoms of speech and press. Now we focus not only on how deep is the
protection granted by the First Amendment but also on what counts as a First
Amendment activity.
There is one final observation I want to make about Ed Baker in the
effort to mark his scholarly achievement and the example he set for all of us.
Perhaps I can make my point best by starting with a confession. Anytime I
come across a newly published article or book about the First Amendment, the
first thing I do is to check the footnotes to see if I am cited. When I do that,
almost always I am disappointed. Not so much because I am not cited enough:
sometimes I feel that way, sometimes I don’t. What is maddening is that too
often I feel that I am cited not by an author who is really trying to understand
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See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979 (1996).
C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1976); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
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what I was saying and either build on that or demonstrate in a careful why it
might be wrong. Usually I am cited because, as luck would have it, some
fragment of my work fits nicely into the argument the author is trying to
advance. My scholarship is used instrumentally, strategically, and sometimes
without strict accuracy or attention to context. The author is cherry picking.
Few of us can resist the temptation to use the work of others in such a selective,
typically mildly distorting fashion. But this is yet another way in which Ed
Baker was different. He used the work of others in an unusually honest,
discerning, faithful, careful way. For this reason, his books and articles serve
wonderfully well as bibliographic resources, even for scholars who do not share
his premises or for other reasons are not persuaded by his arguments. When I
encounter his writings that draw upon the work of others, I feel that I have a
pretty good idea what I want to read next about the subject. This is because Ed
has presented the work of others in a way that does it justice.
Ed Baker was unpredictable but not erratic. He managed to be a fresh
and friendly voice even as he brought to his work unusual levels of intellectual
intensity and moral indignation, doggedness, and concern for consistency. One
can be unpredictable by being a professional gadfly or a dilettante with few real
commitments. Ed was a scholar with the deepest of commitments who
nevertheless managed to turn a different corner and find a new way of looking
at a problem, to take an unexpected position, to use an example one would
never have thought of, not just to be creative but because that is where his
thought led him. His originality, his courage, and his thoroughness were of a
piece. They were expressions of his integrity.

